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Abstract—Over-the-air computation (AirComp)-based feder-
ated learning (FL) enables low-latency uploads and the aggrega-
tion of machine learning models by exploiting simultaneous co-
channel transmission and the resultant waveform superposition.
This study aims at realizing secure AirComp-based FL against
various privacy attacks where malicious central servers infer
clients’ private data from aggregated global models. To this
end, a differentially private AirComp-based FL is designed in
this study, where the key idea is to harness receiver noise
perturbation injected to aggregated global models inherently,
thereby preventing the inference of clients’ private data. However,
the variance of the inherent receiver noise is often uncontrollable,
which renders the process of injecting an appropriate noise
perturbation to achieve a desired privacy level quite challenging.
Hence, this study designs transmit power control across clients,
wherein the received signal level is adjusted intentionally to
control the noise perturbation levels effectively, thereby achieving
the desired privacy level. It is observed that a higher privacy
level requires lower transmit power, which indicates the tradeoff
between the privacy level and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). To
understand this tradeoff more fully, the closed-form expressions
of SNR (with respect to the privacy level) are derived, and the
tradeoff is analytically demonstrated. The analytical results also
demonstrate that among the configurable parameters, the num-
ber of participating clients is a key parameter that enhances the
received SNR under the aforementioned tradeoff. The analytical
results are validated through numerical evaluations.
I. INTRODUCTION
To perform intelligent big-data analysis driven using client-
generated data from mobile devices while preserving the
privacy of the clients, federated learning (FL) [1], [2] has
attracted considerable attention. FL is a distributed machine-
learning (ML) technique that enables clients to learn a shared
ML model collaboratively while keeping their local data on
their devices. Specifically, each client trains an ML model
locally and uploads the model parameters instead of uploading
their local data to a central server. The central server aggre-
gates the model parameters and forms a global model. In FL,
clients are not required to expose their private data to the
central servers, which is beneficial in terms of client privacy.
This is unlike conventional MLs that acquire and store the
training data in central servers, wherein clients’ private data
can be exposed to the central servers.
However, despite these promising benefits, FL involves the
following two challenges: First, uploading model parameters
requires connectivity of many clients via wireless multiple-
access channel with limited radio resources, resulting in con-
siderable upload latencies [1], [2]. Second, despite preventing
the exposure of clients’ private data, FL still faces the risk of
privacy leakage. This happens because the model parameters
uploaded by clients may still be informative [3]–[5], and the
clients’ private data may be inferred by malicious central
servers from the aggregated global model parameters [5].
These challenges call for the design of low-latency multiple-
access schemes that also preserve privacy of clients in the
sense that client private data cannot be inferred by such
inference attacks.
Regarding the first issue of upload latency over wireless
multiple-access channels, over-the-air computation (AirComp)
has emerged as a promising approach [6]–[10]. AirComp
typically computes the desired functions by exploiting the
wireless superposition nature yielded from the simultaneous
transmission of analog-modulated signals. This simultaneous
transmission leads to dramatic latency reduction when com-
pared to the conventional orthogonal access techniques. In the
FL context, the aggregation of model parameters transmitted
by clients can be performed using AirComp. Typically, these
existing studies aim at minimizing the noise perturbation
injected to the computation results of global model parameters.
For example, this goal can be achieved by enhancing the
received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) using user scheduling [6]
or by minimizing the mean squared error (MSE) between
the desired computation results and received symbols through
transmit power control [8], analog beamforming [7], multiple-
input–multiple-output (MIMO) beamforming [9], or phase
shifting by reflecting surfaces [10]. However, the minimization
of noise perturbation and the consequent accurate estimation
of the desired computation results still include risks from
the aforementioned inference attacks performed by malicious
central servers in base stations (BSs) or access points in the
AirComp-based FL.
To tackle these two challenges jointly, we aim to design
an AirComp-based FL that is secure against the aforemen-
tioned inference attacks. This goal is achieved by harnessing
the perturbation from the inherent receiver noises, instead
of minimizing the noise perturbations, thereby preserving
differential privacy [11]. In a nutshell, differential privacy
is a privacy notion quantified by the difference in possible
outcomes of data aggregations (e.g., calculating an arithmetic
mean) performed with or without each individual’s data. The
smaller difference indicates that each individual’s contribution
is smaller, which makes it harder for adversaries to infer data
of each individual. Hence, the smaller difference is interpreted
as a higher privacy level. In the FL context, designing a
differentially private model aggregation with a higher privacy
level makes it harder for malicious model aggregators to infer
clients local models, resulting in the privacy protection from
the aforementioned inference attacks [12]–[15]. Recent studies
designed a differentially private FL in non-AirComp by inject-
ing artificial noises to aggregated global model parameters.
However, unlike these studies, our objective is to design an
AirComp-based FL that preserves differential privacy by using
the inherent receiver noises. Therein, the differential privacy
level depends on the configurable wireless parameters, e.g.,
transmit powers, and hence, designing such parameters is
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necessary, which is an essential difference from designing
differential private FL in non-AirComp.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We design AirComp-based FL that achieves data security
against the aforementioned privacy inference attacks,
based on the following two ideas. The first idea is
preserving a higher level of differential privacy [11] by
harnessing the perturbation from receiver noises inher-
ently injected into aggregated global models. However,
utilizing receiver noises poses the challenge of injecting
an appropriate noise perturbation level to achieve a de-
sired privacy level, because the variance of receiver noises
is often uncontrollable. Motivated by this, the second
idea is to intentionally adjust the received signal level
by controlling the transmit powers, thereby controlling
the perturbation levels effectively so that the desired
privacy level is achieved. Through numerical evaluations,
we demonstrate that the designed transmit power control
achieves a higher privacy level compared to a conven-
tional power control [6] while exhibiting comparable
training performance.
• To obtain a fuller understanding of the performance of
the designed AirComp-based FL, we derive a closed-
form expression that presents the relationship between
the essential performance metrics: received SNR and dif-
ferential privacy level. The analytical results demonstrate
the following two facts: (i) there is a challenging tradeoff
between the received SNR and differential privacy level;
(ii) under a constraint wherein a higher privacy level
is desired, the number of participating clients will be
a major configurable parameter that can enhance the
received SNR. The analytical results are verified through
numerical evaluations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we provide a system model. In Section III, we
design a transmit power control scheme to preserve the differ-
ential privacy with a target privacy level in the AirComp-based
FL model aggregation. In Section IV, we analytically derive
the received SNR and investigate the tradeoffs between the
received SNR and privacy level. In Section V, we present
a numerical evaluation to verify our analytical results. In
Section VI, we present our concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Federated Learning
We consider an FL system comprising I clients and one
BS. A shared model represented by parameters θ is trained
cooperatively across all clients with their own local datasets,
each of which is denoted by Di, where i ∈ I := {1, . . . , I}
denotes the index of clients [1]. The objective of this learning
is to train the parameters θ to minimize the model error,
termed loss function, thereby, obtaining a good approximation
for the target labels:
θ? = arg min
θ
1
|D|
∑
(xj ,yj)∈D
f(xj , yj ;θ), (1)
where D := ∪iDi. In (1), f(xj , yj ;θ) denotes the loss function
with respect to the samples (xj , yj) ∈ D quantifying the error
between the model output and the target label yj with respect
to the input sample xj . The straightforward approach to learn
θ? is to gather the local datasets in the BS and minimize
BS
Broadcasting
model parameters
Waveform superposition
Updating Global Model
Analog-modulating
model updates
Client 1
Training local model
Client 2 ... Client 
Channel inversion
Postprocessing
Fig. 1. AirComp-based FL [6], [7]. The weighted average of model updates
∆i for i = 1, 2, . . . I is computed by exploiting the superposition of analog-
modulated wireless signals. Prior to transmitting amplitude-modulated model
updates, wireless channel inversion is performed at the client side.∑
(xj ,yj)∈D f(xj , yj ;θ)/|D| with respect to the parameters
θ using, for example, the stochastic gradient decent method.
However, this exposes the local datasets to the BS, which is
not desirable owing to privacy concerns.
Alternatively, FL can learn θ? in a distributed manner
keeping the local datasets in each client [1]. Specifically,
FL minimizes the local loss function defined as Fj(θ) :=∑
(xj ,yj)∈Di f(xj , yj ;θ)/|Di| and integrates the learned pa-
rameter updates by, for example, taking a weighted average of
the parameters updates. The detailed procedure is as follows:
First, the BS distributes the shared parameters θglobal across
all clients. Subsequently, each client computes the parameter
updates ∆i to minimize the local loss function. Finally, the
BS integrates the parameter updates uploaded by the clients
by, for example, taking a weighted average as [1]:
θglobal ← θglobal +
∑
i∈I wi∆i∑
i∈I wi
, (2)
where wi ∈ R+ for i = 1, 2, . . . , I denotes the weights
associated to client i. Typically, the weights are set to be the
data size of each client, i.e., |Di| for i = 1, 2, . . . , I [1]. This
procedure is termed round and is iterated until the terminate
conditions are satisfied, e.g., model performance converges or
a predefined number of rounds has been reached.
B. AirComp for FL Model Aggregation
In AirComp-based FL, the BS performs model aggregation
by exploiting the superposition nature of the wireless signals
transmitted by all clients, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Let the local
update computed by client i in a typical round be denoted as
∆i =
[
∆
(1)
i , . . . ,∆
(D)
i
]T
. We consider that transmission time
is slotted as in time division multiple access (TDMA) channel
in a cellular network, and that each element of the local update
is transmitted in each time slot. The clients modulate the
symbol s(d)i := wi∆
(d)
i /
∑
i∈I wi for d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D} with
analog-amplitude modulation, wherein modulated symbols are
constant over a time slot. We also consider that all clients
perform a slot-level synchronization through a synchronization
channel as in timing advance in LTE systems [16]. Therein,
all clients transmit the modulated signals simultaneously to
exploit the superposition nature of the wireless signals. The
modulated signal in the client i is given by
y
(d)
i =
√
2s
(d)
i b
(d)
i cos(2pift), (3)
where f denotes the central frequency of the modulated signal
and b(d)i denotes the power control policies to prohibit the
transmit power from exceeding the predefined maximum value
of P0. Hereinafter, we consider the computation for one time
slot and skip the notation indicating the time slot (d), for ease
of notation.
We consider that the modulated signal is transmitted via a
Rayleigh fading and additive white Gaussian noise channel,
and that it is detected by a matched-filter procedure [17] for
the transmitted signal in (3). Given the distance between the
client i and BS, ri, the product of the transmit and receive
antenna gains, G, and the path loss exponent α, the received
symbol is given by
r =
∑
i∈I
√
βr
−α/2
i
√
Ghibisi + n, (4)
where β is the path loss for a reference unit distance, n ∼
CN (0, σ2n) is the receiver noise, and hi ∼ CN (0, 1) is the
fading channel gain.
The client-side transmission power strategy bi is given such
that we obtain the desired computation
∑
i∈I si from the
received symbol. The solution is the channel inversion pre-
processing with the maximum power constraint |bisi|2 ≤ P0
[6]. In the channel inversion, bi is set as
√
ρ/(r
−α/2
i hi),
where ρ is constant for all clients and is termed the power-
scaling factor. Considering that the maximum transmit power
constraint should be satisfied across all clients, the power-
scaling factor ρ should be [6]
ρ ≤ min
i∈I
r−αi |hi|2
|si|2 P0. (5)
Given the channel inversion, the received symbol at the BS
results in
r =
√
Gβρ
∑
i∈I
si + n0. (6)
We take the real part of the received symbol and multiply
the inversion of
√
Gβρ to obtain the desired model update
aggregation
∑
i∈I si. The computation results are as follows:∑
i∈I
si +
1√
Gβρ
nI, (7)
where nI ∼ N (0, σ2n/2) is the real part of the receiver noise.
III. TRANSMIT POWER CONTROL IN AIRCOMP FL FOR
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
We design the transmit power control for an AirComp-based
FL to achieve differential privacy. Prior to providing details,
we note the definition of differential privacy. Differential
privacy is defined to characterize randomized mechanisms that
output a desired value computed over a dataset perturbed with
a random noise. The definition of differential privacy is as
follows:
Definition 1. (Differential Privacy [11]) A randomized mech-
anism M is (, δ)-differentially private if for any pair of
adjacent dataset 1d and d′ and any sort of possible outcome
S ⊆ Range(M), we obtain
P(M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eP(M(d′) ∈ S) + δ. (8)
In the above definition, Range(M) is the set of all possible
outcomes of M. Note that the values  and δ represent the
similarity in the distribution of the outcomes of the randomized
mechanisms performed over the datasets d and d′, and are
interpreted as a privacy level [11]. Lower  and δ account for
a higher privacy level.
The computation in (7) is also a randomized mechanism,
and the noise perturbation can be controlled by the power-
scaling factor ρ. Hence, an appropriate design of the power-
scaling factor realizes the (, δ)-differential privacy. We set
the power-scaling factor so that differential privacy with the
privacy level  and δ can be preserved in the following
discussion. Note that as the power-scaling factor and transmit
power are proportional to each other, we use “setting the power
scaling factor” and “transmit power control” interchangeably
hereinafter.
A. Update Clipping
In the computation discussed above, there is no limit to the
query sensitivity, which is crucial to preserve the differential
privacy [11]. The sensitivity is generally referred to as the
maximum effect of the attendance of one entity holding
data on the desired computation results. In the case of the
computation in (7), the query sensitivity is given by [12]
max
k∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈I
si −
∑
i∈I\{k}
si
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (9)
A solution to this issue is the application of update clip-
ping, which was proposed in [12] for non-AirComp FL. In
update clipping, the weighted local update in each client
wi∆i/
∑
i∈I wi is bounded by a threshold S > 0, as follows:
si =
wi∆i∑
i∈I wi
min
{
1,
∑
i∈I wi
wi|∆i| S
}
. (10)
In update clipping, the query sensitivity is also bounded by S,
as follows: The sensitivity in (9) is equivalent to maxk |sk|,
which is obviously less or equal to S in the clipping in (10).
B. Power-Scaling Factor Constraint for Differential Privacy
Based on the aforementioned update clipping, we adaptively
choose the power-scaling factor ρ with the objective of the
computation in (7) being (, δ)-differentially private with the
target privacy level of  and δ. First, we provide the condition
that the computation in (7) is (, δ)-differentially private, as
follows:
1In the FL context, the notion of “adjacent” means that one dataset can be
formed by adding or removing all examples associated with a single client
from the other dataset [12].
Lemma 1. (Power-scaling factor constraint for differential
privacy) Given the target privacy level  and δ, the computation
in (7) is (, δ)-differentially private if
ρ ≤ σ
2
n
4Gβ
2
S2 ln(1.25/δ)
. (11)
Proof. From the reproducibility of the Gaussian distribution,
the second term in (7) is also a random variable following a
Gaussian distribution with standard deviation of σn/
√
2Gβρ.
Given the sensitivity of the query bounded by S, the compu-
tation in (7) is (, δ)-differentially private if [11]:
σn√
2Gβρ
≥ S
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)

.
By solving for ρ, we obtain (11).
By setting the power-scaling factor ρ to satisfy both (5)
and (11), we can achieve (, δ)-differential privacy in the
computation in (7). Note that the scaling factor is set to be the
maximum value that satisfies these two constraints, to enhance
the received SNR.
Proposition 1. (Transmit power control preserving differential
privacy) If we set the power-scaling factor ρ as ρ? given by:
ρ? = P0 min
{
min
i∈I
r−αi |hi|2
|si|2 ,
σ2n
4GβP0
2
S2 ln(1.25/δ)
}
,
(12)
then, the computation in (7) is (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. The power-scaling factor ρ? satisfies the constraint for
differential privacy (11); therefore, the computation in (7) with
ρ? is (, δ)-differentially private.
C. Modified Transmit Power Control Anonymizing Client Up-
dates
While setting the power-scaling factor as in (12) to perform
channel inversion, each client requires the information on
the client contribution si for all clients, because the power-
scaling factor in (12) is set according to mini(rαi |hi|2/|si|2).
However, this is contrary to our objective of anonymizing the
clients’ contributions.
Motivated by this, we modify the strategy for setting the
scaling factor satisfying the maximum power constraint (5)
such that information on si is not required. In update clipping,
we have rαi |hi|2/|si|2 ≥ rαi |hi|2/S2 for all clients, and then
mini r
α
i |hi|2/|si|2 ≥ mini rαi |hi|2/S2. Hence, if we set ρ such
that the following condition is satisfied, the constraint (5) will
be satisfied for all clients:
ρ ≤ min
i∈I
r−αi |hi|2
S2
P0. (13)
From (13) and (11), we design the channel inversion strategy
such that the information on si for all clients is not required.
We now have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. (Transmit power control preserving differential
privacy without information on si for all clients) If we set the
power-scaling factor ρ as ρ??, given by
ρ?? =
P0
S2
min
{
min
i∈I
r−αi |hi|2,
σ2n
4GβP0
2
ln(1.25/δ)
}
, (14)
then, the computation in (7) will be (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. The power-scaling factor ρ?? satisfies the constraint for
differential privacy (11); therefore, the computation in (7) with
the strategy ρ?? will be (, δ)-differentially private.
IV. ANALYSIS OF TRADEOFF BETWEEN SNR AND
PRIVACY LEVEL
In the designed transmit power control, there is a tradeoff
between the received SNR and privacy level (, δ), and we
derive this tradeoff analytically. As a higher received SNR
generally leads to a better performance of FL models [6],
this analytical result provides an insight into the difficulty
of enhancing the model performance learned in the designed
AirComp while preserving the differential privacy with a
higher privacy level.
The tradeoff between the received SNR and privacy level
can be obtained by deriving the SNR bound in the designed
transmit power control, as follows:
Proposition 2. (SNR-privacy-level tradeoff) The received
SNR in the designed transmit power control is bounded by
SNR ≤ GβI
2P0∑
i∈I r
α
i σ
2
n
[
1− exp
(
−
∑
i∈I r
α
i σ
2
n
4GβP0
2
ln(1.25/δ)
)]
.
(15)
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 1. The SNR bound in (15) decreases monotonously
as the target privacy level increases (i.e.,  and δ decrease).
This indicates the tradeoff between the received SNR and
privacy level exactly.
It is also remarkable that the number of clients I is the
most important factor for enhancing the received SNR while
preserving a higher privacy level, i.e., smaller values of 
and δ. This fact can be expressed using the first-order Taylor
approximation of the upper bound for the received SNR in
(15). Let the upper bound of the received SNR be denoted by
SNRb. For 2/ ln(1.25/δ)  4GβP0/
∑
i∈I r
α
i δ
2
n, the upper
bound of the received SNR can be approximated by:
SNRb =
GβI2P0∑
i∈I r
α
i σ
2
n
[
1− exp
(
−
∑
i∈I r
α
i σ
2
n
4GβP0
2
ln(1.25/δ)
)]
≈ GβI
2P0∑
i∈I r
α
i σ
2
n
∑
i∈I r
α
i σ
2
n
4GβP0
2
ln(1.25/δ)
=
I2
4
2
ln(1.25/δ)
. (16)
Clearly, the received SNR depends only on the number of
clients. Hence, the number of clients is a key factor for
realizing a higher SNR while preserving a higher privacy level.
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
A. Settings
Clients and BS setting: The evaluation is performed under
the condition that the clients are placed depart from a BS,
at a distance of 100 m, i.e., ri = 100 m for i ∈ {1, . . . , I}.
Both the clients and BS are equipped with omni-antennas, and
hence, G = 0 dBi. The central frequency is considered to be
5.0 GHz. The variance of the receiver noise is σ2n = −60 dBm.
The path loss exponent is α = 2. The path loss for a reference
unit distance β is −46 dB.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of analytical results of SNR bound in (15) and SNR
measured from the simulations for various  with maximum transmit power
of P0 = 10 dBm. A lower  indicates a higher differential privacy level;
hence, this figure demonstrates the tradeoff between the received SNR and
differential privacy level.
Data set: We use the well-known MNIST dataset that consists
of 10 categories of hand-written digits ranging from “0” to
“9”. In the MNIST dataset, the total number of training data
samples |D| is 60000. The training data samples are randomly
partitioned into I equal shares, wherein each client holds
60000/I training data samples.
Training details: The classifier model is implemented using
two-layer fully connected neural networks. The number of
units in each layer is 512. The last fully connected layer is
followed by a softmax output layer. The training is performed
by minimizing the loss function that is a categorical cross-
entropy in this setting. As the optimizer, we use an Adam
optimizer [18] with the learning rate of 1.0× 10−3, decaying
rate parameters β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999, and batch size
32. The model aggregation is performed per 20 epochs for
stochastic gradient descent steps. The clipping threshold S is
set as 5.0× 10−5. The privacy level δ is set as 0.1.
B. Results
Validity of analytical result for received SNR bound:
We validate the analytical results of the upper bound of the
received SNR. Fig. 2 shows the SNR bound in (15) for the
number of clients equal to five and 100 and received SNR
measured in the simulation for  = 0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 0.95. The
maximum transmit power is set as P0 = 10 dBm. Fig. 2 vali-
dates the analysis in the sense that the derived bound for the
received SNR is indeed an upper bound of the received SNR
measured in the simulation. Moreover, Fig. 2 demonstrates that
a lower  results in a lower received SNR, and this tendency
coincides with the analytical upper bound of the received SNR.
This result also validates our statement: there is a tradeoff
between the received SNR and differential privacy level.
We validate the analytical results in (16), i.e., for a higher
target privacy level, the number of clients participating in the
computation has a significant impact on the received SNR,
relative to other wireless factors. Fig. 3 shows the received
SNR in the simulations, along with the analytical results in
(16), under the condition of  = 0.01. As an example, Fig. 3
provides the received SNR for the two maximum transmit
powers P0, i.e., 10 dBm and 30 dBm. We can see that, as the
number of clients increases, the received SNR increases, along
with the analytical SNR bound in (16). When compared to the
increase in the number of clients, the increase in the maximum
20 40 60 80 100−
50
−4
0
−3
0
−2
0
−1
0
Number of clients
SN
R 
(d
B)
Analytical bound in (16)
Simulation, 
Simulation, 
0
Fig. 3. Comparison of analytical results of SNR bound in (16) and measured
SNR in simulation for  = 0.01.
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Fig. 4. Training performance for different numbers of clients for target privacy
level of  = 0.01 and maximum transmit power P0 = 10 dBm.
transmit power does not have an impact on the received SNR.
These facts validate our statement: for a higher target privacy
level, the number of clients is a key factor that enhances the
received SNR.
Training performance: We demonstrate that our designed
power control can achieve a higher differential privacy level
while exhibiting comparable training performance relative to a
conventional power control that sets the transmit power to be
maximum in the constraint (5), i.e., setting the power scaling
factor ρ as ρconv := mini∈I r−αi |hi|2P0/|si|2 [6]. Fig. 4 shows
the training performance and differential privacy level of our
designed power control and conventional power control2 for
number of clients equal to 5 and 100 in the maximum transmit
power P0 = 10 dBm. Note that in the designed power control,
the target privacy level is set as  = 0.01. The conventional
power control does not achieve the target privacy level in
the designed power control, i.e.,  = 0.01, which shows
the superiority of the designed power control to conventional
one in terms of differential privacy levels. Regarding the
training performance, the designed power control exhibits
much poorer performance than the conventional one, owing to
the abovementioned tradeoff, i.e., a lower received SNR for
achieving the privacy level of  = 0.01 when the number of
clients is equal to 5. Meanwhile, when the number of clients is
equal to 100, the training performance in the designed power
control is closer to that in the conventional one, owing to the
enhanced received SNR.
2The privacy level in the conventional power control is calculated with
Lemma 1 by substituting the average power scaling factor E[ρconv] into (11)
and then by solving for the privacy level .
VI. CONCLUSION
We designed AirComp-based FL preserving differential pri-
vacy with a desired privacy level to protect local data of clients
against privacy inference attacks. To this end, we considered
the use of inherent receiver noises and designed transmit
power control to control the level of noise perturbation to
the aggregated global model, ensuring a desired privacy level
could be achieved. To gain insight into the challenges to
achieve a higher privacy level, we derived a closed-form
expression of SNR w.r.t. the privacy level and quantified the
tradeoff between these two metrics. Moreover, the analytical
results demonstrate that the number of participating clients
is the major factor to enhance the SNR under the tradeoff
in particular when a higher privacy level is desired. These
analytical results were verified through numerical evaluations.
The evaluation results also demonstrated the feasibility of the
designed power control achieving a performance comparable
to that of a conventional power control while achieving a
higher differential privacy level.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
From (6), the received SNR is given by
SNR =
Eh,s
[∣∣∣√G√β∑i∈I √ρ??si∣∣∣2]
En0 [|n0|2]
=
Gβ−2Eh,s
[
ρ??
∣∣∑
i∈I si
∣∣2]
σ2n
(a)
≤ GβI
2S2Eh[ρ??]
σ2n
,
(17)
where h := (h1, . . . , hI) and s := (s1, . . . , sI). The inequality
(a) stems from the fact that, in the update clipping in (10),∣∣∑
i∈I si
∣∣ ≤ IS.
In what follows, we derive Eh[ρ??]. To this end, we first
prove the following fact: given that |hi|2 follows an expo-
nential distribution with unit mean, mini |hi|2r−αi follows
an exponential distribution with a mean of 1/
∑
i∈I r
α
i . The
proof is obtained by deriving the complementary cumulative
distribution function (CCDF) of mini |hi|2r−αi . Given x ∈ R,
we have
P
(
min
i∈I
|hi|2r−αi ≥ x
)
= P
(⋂
i∈I
|hi|2r−αi ≥ x
)
= P
(⋂
i∈I
|hi|2 ≥ xrαi
)
=
∏
i∈I
P
(|hi|2 ≥ xrαi ) = exp
(
−
∑
i∈I
rαi x
)
,
which is exactly the CCDF of an exponential distribution with
mean 1/
∑
i∈I r
α
i .
Let σ
2
n
4GβP0
2
ln(1.25/δ) be denoted as gth. From the fact that
g := mini∈I r−αi |hi|2 follows the exponential distribution
with mean 1/
∑
i∈I r
α
i , we obtain Eh[ρ??] as follows:
Eh[ρ??] =
∫ gth
0
ρ?? p(g) dg +
∫ ∞
gth
ρ?? p(g) dg
=
∫ gth
0
gP0
S2
∑
i∈I
rαi exp
(
−g
∑
i∈I
rαi
)
dg
+
∫ ∞
gth
gthP0
S2
∑
i∈I
rαi exp
(
−g
∑
i∈I
rαi
)
dg
=
P0
S2
∑
i∈I r
α
i
(
1− exp
(
−gth
∑
i∈I
rαi
))
. (18)
Substituting (18) into (17), we obtain (15).
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported in part by JSPS KAKENHI Grant
Numbers JP17H03266 and JP18H01442.
REFERENCES
[1] H. B. McMahan, E. Moore, D. Ramage, S. Hampson et al.,
“Communication-efficient learning of deep networks from decentralized
data,” in Proc. AISTATS 2017, Fort Lauderdale, FL, USA, Apr. 2017,
pp. 1–11.
[2] P. Kairouz, H. B. McMahan, B. Avent, A. Bellet, M. Bennis, A. N.
Bhagoji, K. Bonawitz, Z. Charles, G. Cormode, R. Cummings et al.,
“Advances and open problems in federated learning,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1912.04977, Dec. 2019.
[3] N. Carlini, C. Liu, J. Kos, U´. Erlingsson, and D. Song, “The secret
sharer: Measuring unintended neural network memorization & extracting
secrets,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.08232, Jul. 2018.
[4] L. Melis, C. Song, E. De Cristofaro, and V. Shmatikov, “Exploiting
unintended feature leakage in collaborative learning,” in Proc. IEEE
S&P 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA, May 2019, pp. 691–706.
[5] M. Fredrikson, S. Jha, and T. Ristenpart, “Model inversion attacks that
exploit confidence information and basic countermeasures,” in Proc.
ACM SIGSAC 2015, Denver, CO, USA, Oct. 2015, pp. 1322–1333.
[6] G. Zhu, Y. Wang, and K. Huang, “Broadband analog aggregation for
low-latency federated edge learning,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 491–506, Oct. 2019.
[7] K. Yang, T. Jiang, Y. Shi, and Z. Ding, “Federated learning via over-
the-air computation,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 19, no. 3, pp.
2022–2035, Mar. 2020.
[8] X. Cao, G. Zhu, J. Xu, and K. Huang, “Optimal power control for over-
the-air computation,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM 2019, Hawaii, HA,
USA, Dec. 2019, pp. 1–6.
[9] D. Wen, G. Zhu, and K. Huang, “Reduced-dimension design of MIMO
AirComp for data aggregation in clustered IoT networks,” in Proc. IEEE
GLOBECOM 2019, Hawaii, HA, USA, Dec. 2019, pp. 1–6.
[10] T. Jiang and Y. Shi, “Over-the-air computation via intelligent reflecting
surfaces,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM 2019, Hawaii, HA, USA, Dec.
2019, pp. 1–6.
[11] C. Dwork, A. Roth et al., “The algorithmic foundations of differential
privacy,” Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci., vol. 9, no. 3–4, pp. 211–
407, Aug. 2014.
[12] H. B. McMahan, D. Ramage, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang, “Learning
differentially private recurrent language models,” in Proc. ICLR 2018,
Vancouver, Canada, Apr. 2018, pp. 1–14.
[13] R. C. Geyer, T. Klein, and M. Nabi, “Differentially private federated
learning: A client level perspective,” in Proc. NeurIPS Workshops 2017,
Long Beach, CA, USA, Dec. 2017, pp. 1–7.
[14] M. Hao, H. Li, G. Xu, S. Liu, and H. Yang, “Towards efficient and
privacy-preserving federated deep learning,” in Proc. IEEE ICC 2019,
Shanghai, China, May 2019, pp. 1–6.
[15] S. Truex, N. Baracaldo, A. Anwar, T. Steinke, H. Ludwig, R. Zhang, and
Y. Zhou, “A hybrid approach to privacy-preserving federated learning,”
in Proc. ACM AISec 2019, London, UK, Nov. 2019, pp. 1–11.
[16] “Timing in advance.” [Online]. Available: http://4g5gworld.com/blog/
timing-advance-ta-lte
[17] A. Goldsmith, Wireless Communications. Cambridge University Press,
2005.
[18] I. Sutskever, J. Martens, G. Dahl, and G. Hinton, “On the importance
of initialization and momentum in deep learning,” in Proc. ICML 2013,
Atlabta, GA, USA, Jun. 2013, pp. 1139–1147.
